Interview met Fareed Zakaria

Lees hier het interview met Fareed Zakaria, gehouden op 11 juni 2007 te New York.

Door IJsbrand van Veelen

01.00.34 WE THOUGHT WE WOULD EXPORT DEMOCRACY TO COUNTRIES SUCH AS IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN. WHAT WENT WRONG AND WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM THAT?

01.00.38 People think you can export democracy to Iraq or Afghanistan. But there are two misunderstandings: the first is that people say you can’t export democracy because their cultures are different. But that isn’t really true. We have seen democracy develop from the small states in the northern part of Europe, to North America to Korea, Japan and India. The second mistake is to think: Oh! You can do it anywhere anytime. I think the reality is that democracy can spread around the world, but it has to be a process of organic development from within societies. You can help that process, you can engage in certain kinds of foreign policy and nation-building activities, but you have to be modernizing the country. Democracy is a modern form of government.
01.01.42 If everything else in the society is backward, it won’t work. Because all you will have is the shadow and through it all the old antiquated and backward systems will come through. You can see that in countries like Iraq or Pakistan, where the old order - feudal, backward, patriarchal - comes through in the elections. And the only people who win are the thugs, the landowners, the feudal lords…[01.02.14] …and they impose a new kind of control, a new kind of tyranny, except this time legitimized by elections. So it can be done but it is a much more complex process and a much more organic process, than - I think - we thought, when going into Iraq and Afghanistan.

01.02.36 DO YOU THINK ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY CAN GO TOGETHER?

The problem is not Islam and democracy. I think Islam and democracy can go together. But the political and religious culture of modern Muslim societies is in many places backward. And that backwardness makes it difficult for it to exist and thrive with liberal democracy. If you look at Islam, as a religion it has certain aspects that are probably difficult and complicated to be meshed with modern democracy [01.03.14]. But frankly, when you read the Bible and look at Catholicism from the 15th, 16th century, it is as difficult. If you look at all the prohibitions that exist in Islam, most of them actually come out of the Bible - Deuteronomy, Leviticus have almost all the same restrictions on trade, on various aspects of social life. But the societies in the Christian West evolved to a point to where they were able to separate the spiritual sources of importance in the Bible from the day-to-day operational guidelines. And they would take these two things apart. That process is happening more slowly in the Muslim world. [01.03.57]

01.04.02 WHAT ABOUT THE DIVISION OF STATE AND CHURCH?

People will often talk about the division of State and Church, but in Catholicism the Pope was both the head of State and the head of Church. He had his own army. He had his own laws. So there too you had a problem…

BUT THAT IS A LONG TIME AGO...

01.04.24. Yes. What’s fair to say is that Christianity solved this problem over hundreds of years. And Islam today has not yet solved some of its problems. What that means, I think, is important to understand from a philosophical point of view, is that the problem is not the religion. It is the social-political context in which the religion exists. The danger is, if you say it’s the religion…First of all, how do you change the religion? You can’t change the religion, but you can change the social-political context. The 2nd thing is it becomes a very hostile relationship with the 1.2 billion Muslims to tell them: the problem is your religion….
01.05.05
But if you say ‘The problem is the social-political context in which you are living your life, in which women need to have more equality, you need to be comfortable with the world of free trade and markets and private property‘ - that’s something to adjust. But if you say ’The problem is in your religion’, than they’re not going to become un-Muslims tomorrow.

01.05.54 ONE COULD SAY THAT ISLAM IS HIGHLY POLITICIZED, MAYBE EVEN MORE THAN CHRISTIANITY. HOW TO DEAL WITH THAT?

01.05.43. Islam is more politicized than Christianity today. I don’t know compared with the Pope in the 15th century, but certainly today it is more politicized. And the only way I think you can help to deal with that is to help societies to modernize. Because as they modernize they will recognize that you have to separate the spheres of religion and politics. And that as you do that, you realize that there is no Islamic way to pick up the garbage. And no Islamic way to provide health care. And no Islamic way to enter trade-agreements with other countries…But that there is a modern way. And that Islam will exist as a source of spiritual satisfaction and relief. But I don’t think that you can do this from the outside particularly [01.06.29] by telling people their religion is wrong. I think what you have to do is to help these societies enter the modern world. And as they enter they will come to their own understanding. And it is already happening. If you look at countries like Malaysia or Turkey: these are both very conservative Muslim societies but in both cases you have a fundamental compatibility with the modern world.
01.06.53
They are modern. They are growing economically; they have a middle class, a bourgeoisie. And you don’t see the kind of jihadi element within these societies, because they are not trying to blow up the modern world, but succeeding in the modern world. That’s the key. They have to feel as though they are Masters of the Modern World and not Victims of the Modern World. And so you don’t want them to be Samson, wanting to bring the whole temple down on their heads.

01.07.24 WHAT IF DEMOCRATIZATION MEANS ISLAMIZATION, LIKE HAPPENS IN TURKEY?

01.07.36 What if democracy leads to the election of an Islamic fundamentalist party? What if democracy means the election of illiberal forces within society? It has been a problem throughout democracy’s history. It has been a problem in Europe where you had Karl Luger elected in Vienna, where you get Hitler elected in Germany, where the fascists were popular in many countries in Europe. There is no easy answer. Because on the one hand you do want to respect the public’s voice and participation. But I think you have to recognize that democracy means more things, not just the public’s voice. It also means liberty, it also means institutions, it means civil society. So it is a fair question to these bodies: ‘How committed are you to liberty, to civic life, to institutions, to freedom of expression? If you have a society where fundamentally these things are well-rooted and well-anchored, I think it is worth taking the risk. Because in these societies the Islamists will probably have to exist within that context. [01.08.46] But if you have a society that doesn’t have these guards, these safe-guards, than I think it could end up very easily One Man, One Vote, One Time. And Turkey in a sense is a real test case for this.
01.09.01 Turkey is a fascinating example of how to think about this problem of democracy, Islam and liberty. Turkey has been safe-guarded as a secular republic by an unelected elite - the army, the judges - what they sometimes call the kemalist elite, after Kemal Atatürk, the founder of Turkey. This kemalist elite has kept Turkey secular forcibly. For example in Turkey you are by law not allowed to wear the veil or a headscarf in public buildings. By law in Turkey you cannot wear headscarves. There are many such coercive elements that force you to be secular [01.10.03], that force you to be liberal, that force you to respect certain rights and responsibilities. Now Turkey has had these for decades and decades and has become a more and more mature political culture. I think at this point what is happening…in Turkey you are seeing the political voice of people , who say ‘look, we’re mature enough to handle democracy, real democracy and we’re mature enough to handle an islamic party. Because the party that is ruling Turkey right now is Islamic in the sense that Christian-democratic parties in the west are Christian. It is influenced by Islam, it is socially conservative, but it is in no way challenging the institutions of secularism. The changes that this party wants to make, as far as I can tell, are very much on the level of the surface. They are not deeply rooted in changing the fundamental secular structure of the state.
01.11.05 So there I think… Turkey is a country that has matured and institutionalized under an authoritarian framework. It gained its liberalism under an authoritarian framework - but now it may be time to allow it to experiment with full participatory democracy. Let us even assume that this Islamic party - and the party hates being called Islamic because they really don’t see themselves that way - but this party decides that they want to do some things that they so far have not said that they would [01.11.40]. What are the demands of some of these Islamics in Turkey? They would like the ban on headscarves to be removed. They would like Friday to be the day of holiday rather than Sunday. Changes like that. Now it strikes me in a society that is 99,9% Muslim this is not the end of the world and this is not a sign of illiberalism. To say that our religious holiday falls on Friday rather than Sunday - fine! If you want to wear a headscarf - it should be a matter of choice, personal choice. Nobody is saying you have to wear a headscarf [01.12.13] There are some things with the educational system. They want to infuse a little bit more religion in the educational system. This is a debate that takes place in America every day, about how much religion is appropriate and how much has to be secular. I myself would prefer more secular but I understand that - again - if you have a devout population in the south of the US they teach creationism. I think it’s silly, but I can understand that they have a legal right in a democracy to do that.

01.12.41. WITH THAT YOU’RE HITTING UPON THE FLEXIBILITY OF DEMOCRACY. BECAUSE LET’S SAY THAT TWO-THIRDS IN THIS COUNTRY WOULD SAY, ‘WE’RE NOT GOING TO TEACH DARWIN ANYMORE. OR SUPPOSE IN TURKEY TWO-THIRDS WOULD SAY, ‘WOMEN ARE NOT ALLOWED TO WORK ANYMORE’ - THEN: WHAT TOT DO?

01.13.00 So let’s say you have two-thirds of the people in the US who say we’re not going to teach Darwin anymore - alas, that’s democracy. In a mature, advanced democracy, I think we’d all understand: ‘look, that’s their right’. And it may be foolish and there are some school districts in the US - many fewer than people think- but there are a few school districts where they ban evolution. People move, people don’t go to those school districts, they don’t send their children to those schools if they disagree with that….
01.13.42 The question becomes in the Turkish context: ‘Do the islamists in Turkey want something that is fundamentally illiberal?’ And so far you have to be guided by their actions, by their statements - there is nothing that would suggest that. They do want to remove some of the coercive secularism of the state [01.14.02] So you have a kind of balance there, where you’re going to have a greater injection of some Islamic sentiments and symbols in society. But is that fundamentally illiberal or is that a recognition of the reality that Turkey is 99.9% Muslim? And I think you have to be able to draw that line. I would argue that the Turks are too worried, too paranoid that you allow headscarves and soon you will have Sharia laws and Islamic courts and Islamic banking. There seems to be no such move in Turkey. They seem to understand that the modern world will not allow that kind of thing.
01.14.42 - 01.14.48 What the Turkish secular elite is forgetting, is that human beings need some sense of identity and some sense of recognition. And you don’t fall in love with constitutional liberalism, you fall in love with something more about identity, religion and culture. And if you allow some of this into the public sphere, you will strengthen the society, as long as you are sure that you have safe-guards. And my sense is that you have safe-guards.
01.15.22 The debate that is taking place in Turkey is a very mature and sophisticated debate because what the Turkish elite, the kemalist elite are saying is ‘look, these safeguards are not strong enough yet. And we are the safeguards. If you remove all those safeguards, who will protect us?’ And the islamists are saying: ‘we accept the basic structure of the Turkish state, you don’t need to be standing there on the gate, you don’t need to be sitting on the judge’s chair. We accept the bargain’. At the end of the day I think Turkey is mature enough to handle full-fledged democracy at this point.

01.16.06 SO, AFTER ALL, OF THESE TWO MODERN PARTIES, THE KEMALISTS AND THE ISLAMISTS, WHO ARE THE MODERN ONES?

01.16.16 Of the two parties - the kemalists and the islamists - who are modern? In the Turkish context over the last five years you’d have to say: it is the islamists. It is the islamists that have revolutionized the Turkish economy. To bring it in conformity with the EU. It is the Islamists who have changed Turkeys legal system to bring it in conformity with the EU. It is the islamists who given major concessions to the Kurds, allowing them their language, allowing them greater autonomy. In other words, all of those things that liberals would say you should do to create a more civilized society.
[01.16.58] The Kemalists have in a strange sense an old-fashioned sense of modernity. That is: a very strong state, very coercive, very hard lined in which the state is also very involved in the economy. The Islamists have been more free market, more free trade, more pro-European Union and softer on the Kurds. So you have to come to the conclusion that the modernizing force in Turkey today are actually the islamists, not the secular Kemalists

01.17.29 WHY IS IT, DO YOU THINK, THAT THE ISLAMISTS WANT TO JOIN EUROPE SO MUCH? THEY SEEM TO BE THE MOST THRIVING FORCE IN JOINING EUROPE.

01.17.41 I asked a politician of the AK-party many years ago: “Why are you so committed to Europe? This was before they were in power, and I was trying to understand: ‘is this phony, is this all rhetoric, or will they really, when they’re in office, make a bid to bring Turkey to the European Union?’ And he said something to me which I think is very interesting. He said, “Look , fundamentally we think our rights will be protected better by European judges than Turkish generals [01.18.10] In other words: he saw the EU and its structure as protecting the freedom of religion, the freedom of association, the freedom of press, which are all things that they want. Because until now in Turkey is has been banned to spread certain kinds of religious doctrines, literature, perfectly harmless stuff - but the secular elite feared that this would turn the society into some kind of Islamic society [01.18.42]

01.18.49 The Islamists have seen the European Union as a place that would help them create a more open public space. And they want not a domination of the public space, but an open public space where islamic ideas can compete with other ideas. I think that that is the essence of a healthy liberal democratic order.

01.19.08 I THINK, HEARING THIS, THAT FOR THE MOST EUROPEANS THIS WOULD COME AS A SHOCK. THEY WOULD GO LIKE ‘THE GENERALS, THEY’RE WITH US, AND THE ISLAMISTS, THEY’RE THE ENEMY. AND IT’S THE WHOLE WORLD UPSIDE DOWN’.

01.19.26 I think you’re exactly right. Most Europeans will first hear that the generals are the upholders of the secular order. The Islamists are the forces that you see sweeping the Arab world. They must be part of this Islamic fundamentalist movement. But the difference is that Turkey has modernized as a society over the last 60 or 70 years. And these islamists are very different from the ones in Egypt or the ones in Lebanon or the ones in Iraq. These are sophisticated liberals who also happen to have some views that are influenced by Islam [01.20.01]
If you look at what they’ve done in office. I think what’s important to think about is not just politician’s rhetoric, but their actions. These Islamic politicians in action have been the ones who have been in favor of free markets, the European Union, a more liberal judicial system, a more liberal attitude toward the Kurds. The secular generals and judges have been hard line on all those issues. So in the Turkish context, the force for progress and modernity seems to be on the Islamic side.
01.20.33
Now the argument some people will make is that this is a Trojan horse. That they will bring in Islamist ideas through the backdoor and that they’re seducing you by presenting an easy frame …
-AND ONCE THEY’RE IN POWER…
01.20.49 And once they’re in power, truly in power, when they have the presidency, the parliament, they’ll put in place their actions… I don’t think so, because it is very important to remember this about Turkey: the Islamists only win about 30 - 35% of the votes. The structure of the Turkish parliamentary system - which is similar to the European system - is that they end up the majority party. But they are well aware that they only have 35% of the votes. It is not as though 70% of the people is going to vote for the Islamist party. They understand that they are a part of a society in which there is actually a substantial support for a more radical secularist idea. So they’re well aware that they exist in competition with other political ideologies and not as a monopoly.

01.21.39 SO YOU ALSO SEE THAT THERE IS VERY LITTLE CHANCE OF THEM GETTING TWO-THIRDS OF THE VOTES AND BE ABLE TO MALE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES OR…?

01.21.50 There is no chance of the AK-party getting two-thirds of the votes. At most it gets 30-35% of the votes.

WHICH IS SURPRISING BECAUSE 90/95% OF THE TURKS CALL THEMSELVES MUSLIMS, RIGHT?

01.21.59.
99% is Muslim. But the reality is that Turkey is a serious political culture. They have old parties that have grassroots organizations. There are two right of center parties that are in some way or other kemalist or secular in orientation. There are one or two Islamic parties. And so the spectrum forces a certain kind of debate on these issues. It is not as though if you just allowed people to vote, 99% would say they wanted to replace the civic code with the Sharia laws or anything like that.
01.22.37
In Turkey, people misunderstand the situation and think: ‘If you would allow the vote, you would have instant Islamic majorities on every issue’. But that is not true. On issues of economy there is a majority for liberal reforms. On Europe for example, the majority consistently has wanted EU membership, even when they understand that it involves changing their legal system, changing their economic system, changing many, many aspects of society that they have gotten very comfortable with.

1.23.11 THE CURRENT PRIME MINISTER OF TURKEY SAID AT SOME POINT: “IS EUROPE A HOME FOR AN ALLIANCE OF CIVILIZATIONS OR IS IT A CHRISTIAN CLUB?” AND THEN HE CONTINUED, “IF THE FORMER IS TRUE, THEN TURKEY SHOULD BE PART OF IT”. WHAT DO YOU THINK OF THAT?

I think that what the prime minister of Turkey is saying is really a fundamental question for Europe, and is does not help for Europe not to take it seriously. Europe has to ask itself what is it fundamentally about? Is it about ideas and ideals and rights, or is it about a shared religious experience. These are really the two possibilities. Because if it is a shared religious experience of Christianity, then Turkey is entirely ineligible. But if it’s really about ideas of liberty and equality and fraternity and about constitutionalism, then why is Turkey not a potential candidate, only if it satisfies all other criteria? But it should certainly be a potential candidate. After all: Europe already has within it many Muslims, whether it is in Albania, in Bosnia, or whether it’s in France or Germany.

01.24.36 BUT THAT IS ALSO THE FEAR OF THE WHITE EUROPEANS… BECAUSE THEY’RE FEARING… THERE ARE PEOPLE IN THE NETHERLANDS FOR INSTANCE THAT ARE TALKING ABOUT A TSUNAMI OF ISLAMISM HITTING THE SHORES OF EUROPE…

01.24.47 If Europe is worried about Islam, it would seem to me the answer is not to turn your back on the one modern Muslim country in the world.

01.25.00 If your fear is about Islam - you already got it. You already have millions of Muslims within your borders. So then the question of how to modernize them becomes the crucial one. And in that context it would seem to me you would want to have as much association possible with the one modernizing Muslim society. We’re not talking about linking up with Saudi Arabia here. We’re talking about linking up with a country that is increasingly liberal economically, politically…that is growing at 7% a year, that has a thriving business class, and that has a long constitutional history [01.25.35]

Remember - if you look at the Turkish legal system and constitutional system you see that it is basically independent and secular. It is not that much older than many European countries that had, shall we say, very different systems in the 1930’s. Modern Turkey’s legal system has been around for about as long as modern Germany’s legal system has been around. In fact a little bit longer.

01.26.03 DO YOU THINK THE FEAR THAT WE SEE WITH SECULARISTS IN TURKEY BUT ALSO IN EUROPE – DO YOU THINK THAT IT’S JUSTIFIABLE AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND IT?

01.26.25 Absolutely. I think the fear that Europeans have about the backwardness of Islam, that Turkish secularists have about their islamists are justifiable fears. These are real issues. And the problem of empowering highly illiberal and religious forces is a very real one. If we were talking about another Muslim society, I would say you should be more careful. And I would not advocate holding a mass-plebiscite in Jordan or Saudi Arabia tomorrow. I think that you would do that at your own peril, because those societies have gone through no process of modernization. They do not have institutions in there. But Turkey is different and I think this is where the sophistication of Europe could come into play.
01.27.13 Europe is a sophisticated society and can understand the differences. Turkey has longstanding and well-established courts, it has a well-established educational system, it has a well-established structure of authority - all of which are checks and balances that can be kept in place. And so it seems to me this is going to be one of those places where slowly you have to increase the democratic franchise.
01.27.40 This is after all what happened in Europe: you had institutional structures in place. But initially only men could vote - men with property could vote, then men could vote, then it became women, then you lowered the voting age so you were slowly, slowly bringing more and more people into the system. In a sense that’s what’s going on in Turkey. The barriers are not really about age and property, but they are about a modern mindset.
01.28.03
And so the army used to intervene every time it used to feel that they were getting illiberal forces or religious forces were invading the society. And they stopped doing that now, because they feel that the society is more mature.

01.28.18
So if you think about the army, the Turkish army, it had three formal coups in the last 50 years. Than it has had a so-called soft coup.
-IN 1997?
In 1997 it has one soft coup, and now, in relationship to the AK- Party it has had what people call an e-coup, because they posted on their Internet site a condemnation of the attempt by the AK-party to take the presidency [01.28.48] But it means that it softens. The army’s opposition is softening and I think even in a sense that the army recognizes that the AK-party is not the Muslim-fundamentalists that they used to worry about 50 years ago.

01.29.01 DO YOU THINK THE ARMY THINKS THAT, OR DO YOU HOPE THE ARMY THINKS THAT?

I think that the army thinks that. I think that the army recognizes that while there are dangers from this new wave of Islamism it’s fundamentally different from the past… Otherwise I think that they would have actually moved more decisively and actually depose the government. Which they have not done. It’s very striking that the army has protested and let its displeasure be known, but it has not moved in a way that it was comfortable doing 20 or 30 years ago. And that itself is a sign of the maturation of Turkey - that the army would not, unilaterally, decide that it could just depose the government. Remember, this still happens in many countries. In Pakistan the army deposed the government only 7 years ago.

01.30.00 NOW THERE ARE ELECTIONS COMING UP IN TURKEY, THE 22ND OF JULY. WHAT DO YOU EXPECT WILL HAPPEN? BECAUSE THERE ARE ALSO PEOPLE SAYING IT MIGHT VERY WELL BE THAT THE ARMY IS NOT GOING TO ALLOW AN ISLAMIC PRESIDENT IN TURKEY. AND WE SEE NOW THERE ARE ATTACKS, THE KURDS ARE BEING BLAMED AGAIN. THERE ARE PEOPLE SAYING IT’S NOT THE KURDS, IT’S THE ARMY BECAUSE THEN THERE IS MORE POWER IN THE STREETS SO THEY CAN SHOW MORE MUSCLE - HOW DO YOU THINK ABOUT THAT?

01.30.36 My own guess is that the army will not halt the democratic process. That they will try to express as much opposition and reservation as they can, within the democratic process. And keeping in mind that they have a special role in Turkey - and that by the way is quite popular. The army is a very popular part of Turkey. I spoke to Abdullah Gül, the foreign minister of Turkey who is their presidential candidate, the AK-party’s presidential candidate, and Gül was at pains to say to me how proud he was of the army and how important the army was in Turkish society [01.31.11]. Because even he understands that there is no gain even for an islamist politician to run against the army. The army is popular in Turkey. And that is what I mean about Turkey: it has many competing centers of power. The AK-party has its base, but the army has its base, the kemalist elite have their base, there are other parties…- so I think what will happen is the Army will let the democratic process play itself out [01.31.36]. But they will be very watchful of what Gül - if it is indeed he who becomes the president - does as a president. The president can appoint judges, he can appoint presidents of universities, he can do things with the civil service. And if Gül tries to pack the entire system with islamists and really fundamentalist types of Islam, I think then not only the army would react, but I think Turkish society would react. Because that would be over-interpreting the mandate that the AK-party has and that is another kind of democratic problem. People will often do that. They will think that, well, with 30% of the vote or 35% of the vote, they have a huge mandate [01.32.19]. And I would caution the AK-party not to do that. But that’s the nature of democracy.

-OTHERWISE IT WOULD TURN INTO WHAT YOU ONCE DESCRIBED AS THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY?

01.32.31. Exactly. And if you end up with a situation where people forget that there are other, large minorities in the country that feel differently than you, and you try to impose your will on them, then, yes, you have De Tocqueville’s problem of the tyranny of the majority and that tyranny is as bad for a minority as it were a dictatorship.

01.32.55 – WHY SHOULD TURKEY ACTUALLY JOIN EUROPE? WHY COULDN’T IT BE LIKE NORWAY OR SWITZERLAND HAVING FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS BUT JUST REMAIN THIS IN-BETWEEN PLACE THAT IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN?

It’s really for Europe to decide what it wants to do with its power. Europe has an extraordinary weapon at its disposal. I like to sometimes think of this as Europe’s nuclear bomb [01.33.25] By which I mean: Europe has found a way through the power of potential EU-membership, to totally transform societies. If you think about the power that Europe has had over Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, The Balkans, Poland, the Czech Republic… it’s extraordinary. This is the kind of transformational power that we normally associate with the United States. But it is really Europe that has done this. And its nuclear weapon has been the prospect of membership in the European Union [01.34.00]. So the question for the European Union is: Does it want to take this power that it has, and try to use it to do two things. One, to really help in the modernization of Islam, which is the single biggest problem the world faces in some sense, and secondly, does it want to fundamentally reshape its strategic relationship with the entire Muslim belt to its south? [01.34.28]. Bringing Turkey in - on terms that Turkey is able to meet the criteria of EU-membership - would have a seismic effect on both dimensions. It would mean that you’d be helping stabilize your Muslim periphery. It would also mean that you’d be sending a very powerful signal to the world that there is a modern, moderate version of Islam that is acceptable. And finally I would say, which is not unimportant: Europe needs young workers. The simple reality of Europe is that if you don’t have young workers over the next 30 - 40 years, you cannot sustain your economic system [01.35.08]. I think it’s better to get them from one or two countries where you can have some control over the quality of education, labor, civil society - otherwise you’re gonna do what you have done the last 30 years, which is that they come in drips and drabs from Morocco, Somalia, Indonesia wherever. And they come in, and they come from the poorest parts of these societies and then they’re in Amsterdam, they’re in Paris and they’re completely backward and you don’t have any way of helping in the process of raising their own standards of living and opening their horizon [01.35.44] whereas if you were to do it in the way you have with Greece or with Ireland, you can raise the whole society up. And then the quality of labor you’re getting in is also better.

01.35.58 PEOPLE ARE COMPARING THE DEVELOPMENTS IN TURKEY OVER THE LAST TEN YEARS TO WHAT HAPPENED IN POST-FRANCO SPAIN, THEY EVEN TALK ABOUT A WIRTSCHAFTSWUNDER. WHAT’S GOING ON THERE IN CENTRAL-ANATOLIA, WHAT HAS HAPPENED?

01.36.10 I think it’s a fair analogy. If you look at what’s happening in Turkey right now, it does have some parallel to post-Franco Spain, or Greece after the colonels. Remember it is still very backward in parts of the country, Central Anatolia, but remember there were very backward parts of Spain and Greece 25 years ago. And what I’m struck by in Turkey is not the snapshot, but the moving picture. That is: if you look at Central Anatolia today, it still looks backward, but if you look at where it was 20 years ago, or 10 years ago, there has been enormous movement. You’ve seen the rise of an entrepreneurial class, of private business, of civic society as a result. You see a modern outlook, you see Turkish companies do well [01.37.04], learn how to engage in the world of trade, capitalism, commerce. These are all instruments of modernity. And then you see as a result people more and more comfortable with a modern legal system and things like that [01.37.19]. Look they still dress like peasants, they still dress with headscarves and very traditionally, but that is surface, those are surface symbols. You can’t let that distract you from the reality of a society that is modernizing [01.37.43]. I mean the Turkish growth rate has been 7% year on year for the last 5 or 6 years, inflation is down 10% - these are all the assets of modernity that are changing Turkey. And they’re in some ways much more important than whether the older generation wears headscarves or not
01.38.03

02.00:18
THIS ENTREPRENEURIAL CLASS YOU WERE TALKING ABOUT, THEY HAVE BEEN DUBBED 'THE ISLAMIC CALVINISTS'. HAVE YOU HEARD OF THAT TERM?

I have heard of the term, the 'Islamic Calvinists'. And I think the reason people say that, is because, there's this whole new group of people in Turkey, a generation, who are: Islamic, they are religious, devout, the pray, they observe many of the rituals of religion, but they're real businessmen - they want to make money. And so people say: Islamic Calvinists. Now, I don't know if it will work out exactly as Calvinism did, but I think it's also important to remember: Calvinism took a while to make its peace with modernity.

02.01:00
And we now think of Calvinism as meaning: individualism, democracy, and freedom of speech. The Calvinists were a pretty nasty bunch, who believed in a very authoritarian vision of society that was religiously not just monotheistic, but authoritarian, coercive. That's why so many people left Europe and came to the United States. So, it's important to remember that, you know, religions take time to mellow.

02.01:30
And what you're saying, what you're seeing in Turkey is actually a fairly liberal form of religious observance, when you consider that it is by and large compatible to the modern world, democracy. So yes, there are Islamic Calvinists, and I would say in many ways liberal Calvinists compared to the original variety in Northern Europe.

02.02:00
WHAT WOULD YOU SAY TO PEOPLE WHO SAY: "WELL OKAY, SUPPOSE MR. ZAKARIA AND MR. GÜL, AND ALL THESE PEOPLE ARE SAYING, SUPPOSE THEY’RE ALL RIGHT. AND SUPPOSE INDEED THERE IS NO HIDDEN AGENDA, THERE IS NO TROJAN HORSE, IT'S OKAY THAT TURKEY JOINTS EUROPE, BUT: WE STILL DON'T WANT THEM TO JOIN EUROPE, BECAUSE CULTURALLY, IN TERMS OF OUR CULTURAL ROOTS, WE ARE DIFFERENT".

02.02:30
If Europe decides that Turkey cannot join because they are culturally different, then, to my mind, that is a very different definition of what the European Union stands for, than what it has been saying the last thirty years. Europe has described itself as a modern society, based on certain values. If you now start talking about culture, which is after all a codeword for religion, what does it mean about Europe? what do people mean when they are talking about culture. I mean, the culture of Serbia and the culture of Britain are very different.

02.03:00
And frankly, the culture of Sicily and the culture of Holland are very different. The languages are all different. So, when you talk of culture, you are either speaking about religion, or you are pretending to speak about something else. Fundamentally, the real question is: Does Europe wish to be a society that is defined by its values, or by its religious experience?

02.03:30
CAN EUROPE AFFORD TO DENY TURKEY?

Yes, Europe can afford to deny Turkey a membership. You know, the world will go on - the world always goes on. And Turkey will survive, Europe will survive, but it will be a great missed opportunity. For both. And it will be a great tragedy because it would mean that Europe would have missed this opportunity to really use its influence and power to shape up the modern world. In many ways as I say, I think, to help itself economically...

02.04:00
... by injecting this new, young nation into its midst, but most fundamentally, to take the central problem of our time, which is to take the one civilization that has not yet found its way into the modern world, and to make it happen. And wouldn't it be fascinating if despite the fact that we live in an era of American unipolarity, it was Europe that actually led the path in that process. It has that opportunity...

02.04:30
...it just needs the political will. And courage, and generosity of spirit to recognize that it will be helped and it will help the world by doing it.

IN EUROPE THERE IS A LOT OF TALK ABOUT TURKEY BECOMING READY FOR EUROPE, TURKEY BEING READY FOR EUROPE. BUT, IN HOW FAR IS EUROPE READY FOR TURKEY?

02.05:00
Very good question. You know, is Europe ready for Turkey? I think Europe is in some ways in the same place than Turkey's secular leaders. That they are very suspicious of some things about Turkey, legitimately. Certain elements of backwardness, which must be modernized before Turkey comes in to Europe. But they are also suspicious of things that are just natural expressions of a different culture and a different society.

02.05:30
Whether or not women wear headscarves, surely is not important. People dress differently all over the world, people wear differently all over Europe. This has become a kind of symbol of backwardness which seems to me as unfair. In some ways it is a symbol of people's devoutness. And that's surely not something that Europe wants to - that's surely not something that should disbar somebody from membership in the European Union...

02.06:00
...that a higher percentage of people believes in God and religion, then - lets say - in Holland and Belgium. The reality is that there are aspects of Turkey that are in fact not modern, and should worry Europeans. But they are being modernized, and if Europe engages, they will be modernized faster and more fully.

02.06:30
Then there are elements of Turkey that are about being a different society - coming from a different culture, having had a different historical experience - and Europe has to get a little bit more comfortable with that pluralism. Give Turkey some space. I think in many ways, this was true even of Greece. And is certainly true of Albania and Serbia. These are different societies, and you have to be comfortable that they are not...

02.07:00
...going to look exactly like the good burgers of Holland and Germany. With Turkey there is a reluctance to do that. Because people immediately get very suspicious. And they think that this means that it’s going to change Europe. I think far more likely, is that Europe will change Turkey, than that Turkey will change Europe.

IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT TURKEY HAS LIKE SEVENTY MILLION PEOPLE COMING IN TO...: IT WOULD BE THE BIGGEST EUROPEAN COUNTRY.

02.07:30
Well, Germany is the biggest. Turkey would be a very large country in Europe. But remember, nobody is talking about Turkey joining Europe tomorrow. People are talking about Turkey joining Europe twenty, twenty-five years from now. The real question that faces Europe today: is do you want to close the door, or do you want to keep it open? Turkey should not become part of Europe unless it is modernized. But the question is: if it is modernized twenty years from now, should it be disbarred because of its religion, or should that door then swing wide open?

02.08:00
No European today is being asked to make a decision on Turkish membership tomorrow. What they are being asked is: it is possible to imagine a modern Turkey that would be a part of Europe, really one generation from now. And that's what Europe should, that's how Europe should think about it. That's the timeframe. I don't believe, and I don't think the advocates of Turkish membership would argue, that Turkey today should be a member of the EU.

02.08:30
But twenty years from now, will Turkey be so different from Greece when it joined the European Union? Or Portugal when it joined the European Union? That's the question.

REMARKABLY ENOUGH, SARKOZY IN FRANCE JUST DOESN’T AGREE ONE WORD WITH YOU, IF WE LISTEN CAREFULLY TO HIM. IN ALMOST EVERY SPEECH HE GIVES, HE'S SAYING, ALMOST AS A SIDELINE: "TURKEY SHOULDN'T JOIN. I AM AGAINST IT".

02.09:00
Look, one of the things going on in the world today, is that globalization is opening up the world at a frightening pace. It's happening fast, it's happening in a disorienting way, and politicians are playing to that, by making people scared. By telling them that this world out there is going to overwhelm you and I will be your protector. I will stop these changes; I will keep things at bay.

02.09:30
Mr. Sarkozy on Turkey is like many other politicians in Europe and politicians in America, who are saying: "We'll stop immigrants, will stop trade, we'll do all these things that will somehow bring back the comfort and security of the old order". You can't do it. The world is changing, and whether or not Turkey is part of that, the reality is that these movements of good-services-people are going to happen much faster than people realize. What Sarkozy is doing on this issue...

02.10:00
... is trying to get a certain degree of cheap popularity. He also knows that it's not a decision that is going to come up for years and years, so it's an easy way for him to do it. It doesn’t cost him anything; he doesn't have to do anything. But, it does mean - but it does cost him one thing - which is: what is his strategic vision for Europe? What is his strategic vision of how Europe will deal with the Muslim belt around it? What is his idea of how to modernize the Muslim world?

02.10:30
I have heard lots of people criticize the idea of Turkish membership. So what do they want to do? And how do they propose to engage with this huge problem that Europe has around it?

AND INSIDE MAYBE, BECAUSE THEY MIGHT TRY TO KEEP THE MUSLIM CIVILIZATION OUT, BUT THERE'RE IN ALREADY, RIGHT?

Precisely, I mean that's exactly right. Europe's problem is not just the Muslim belt outside it, but that there is now a Muslim belt inside it, and that the two are related.

02.11:00
That if you can't find a way to help modernize the belt outside, you're not going to modernize the belt inside. You know again: the world has become porous; these people move back and forth, the ideas move back and forth, goods move back and forth. So, you have to think of this all as part of one puzzle.

WHEN YOU LOOK AT THAT AND YOU THINK AGAIN OF DEMOCRACY, COULD A WHITE EUROPEAN OR A WHITE AMERICAN SAY: ...

02.11:30
... "DEMOCRACY IS STILL OURS?" OR IS THE IDEA OF DEMOCRACY BEING, LET SAY, 'EASTERNIZED'?

I'd say one of the most important things that has happened in the world over the last thirty years, has been the spread of democracy to non-Western countries. Like South-Korea, like Taiwan. And that process is very powerful and very important because it shows that democracy is not inherently, by definition a Western product.

02.12:00
But the success of democracy in the West, and the mixed record outside the West, shows that the West, because it is more modern, because it has the process of institutionalization and civic society, it naturally going to be far more successful at it, at this stage. I think what that means is that the West has an opportunity and an obligation to help non-Western societies that are struggling with these problems.

02.12:30
I don't think that one could really say democracy has been 'Easternized', but it has certainly been globalized. And, as with everything globalized, you can always help in this process because you loose something in the translation. And you have to make sure that the product that you end up with six thousand miles away has some relationship in its core with the product that was exported.

02.13:00
IS THE ARAB WORLD READY FOR TURKEY JOINING EUROPE?

That's a very good question. Is the Arab world ready for Turkey joining Europe; is the Muslim world ready for Turkey to join Europe?

02.13:30
In a way, if Turkey would join the European Union, it would be a greater philosophical problem for the Islamic fundamentalists than for the Europeans. Because the Islamic fundamentalists have always argued that it is impossible to be a devout Muslim, and a religious Muslim, and be allied with the West, part of the West, part of the modern world - this would be the most powerful symbol of....

02.14:00
...the alliance between modernity and Islam. Of democracy and Islam, of liberalism and Islam - and it would be working, it would be succeeding. How do you explain that? You know, just as the Muslim fundamentalists have a very difficult time with a place like Dubai. How do you explain Dubai? This very modern, glittering city that is yet Muslim. Turkey would be a much larger refutation of that kind of thesis, ...

02.14:30
... because it is a large country, an ancient civilization, and you can't argue that it is peripheral. After all, what does Osama Bin Laden want to do? He wants the return of the caliphate. Where did the caliphate begin? In Turkey. So if that country says no, we don't want a caliphate, we want to be part of the West, part of the modern world, part of the democratic order - that's a very powerful symbol.

SO BASICALLY WHAT YOU ARE SAYING IS: IN ORDER TO CONTAIN FUNDAMENTALISM EUROPE SHOULD OPEN THE DOOR TO TURKEY? NOT NOW, BUT IN TWENTY YEARS.

02.15:00
If Europe wants in some serious way tackle the problem of Islam and fundamentalism, then it seems to me: this is its greatest opportunity. To help modernize Turkey, to help modernize Turkey by laying out a path where Turkey can join the European Union, if it continues the modernization process. The ultimate goal is twenty years away, but along the way you will have this powerful effect...

02.15:30
...on Turkey and the world of Islam. And for Europe to miss that, out of momentary fears and panics, is I think to miss Europe's real calling as a civilization.

02.16:00
If you look at the world of Islam, one of the reasons it is so politicized, is because you have these dictatorships all over. Which suppress, and oppress political discussion. So the one place where people can gather is the mosque, and nobody can censure that. And the one language which has to remain free, is the language of religion. So all opposition, all discontent channels itself through that one place. So you end up with repressive regimes, and increasingly...

02.16:30
... intolerant, angry religious opposition movements. And that's the picture of almost every Muslim society in which you have this problem, and certainly the picture of many Arab countries. It is not the picture in Turkey. Because Turkey is an open system: you have lots of political parties, you have lots of voices, and lots of avenues for expression. And as a result the opposition in Turkey is not particularly religious - some parts of it are, some parts of it aren't.

02.17:00
The mosque it not a particularly politicized place - in some places it is, and in some places it isn't. You know, it is a much more mixed picture which you would expect from a society that has many escape valves. Many places where people can voice their discontent. You can see the same thing by the way in Islam in India, another democratic society. Remember: India has a hundred million Muslims, and there too, you have very little fundamentalism, because if you want to start a political party, you can do it.

02.17:30
If you want to have a newspaper that says things, you can do it. So in a strange sense, Islam in Turkey is less politicized, than say in Saudi Arabia or Egypt, where for peculiar reasons having to do with the structure of the regime, Islam has become the Great Alternative.

WHAT IN THE END SHAPES OUR IDENTITY? IS THAT RELIGION, OR IS IT DEMOCRACY? OR LIBERTY, OR...

02.18:00
It's a very good question. I think fundamentally what shapes our identity, is probably... I would say what fundamentally shapes our identity is actually liberty. And individual autonomy, and freedom, and this has been the great insight and the great gift of the West to the world. But, it is also true that people feel a great yearning for those softer elements of identity;...

02.18:30
...religion, culture, family, and that if you suppress those, or you try to pretend they don't exist, they come back very powerfully. And that is something - that second part - that Europe has forgotten. Because Europe itself has evolved to a different place. That there are many, many parts of the world, including the United States, including the Muslim world, where those core elements of identity are still strong. The trick is how to make those two elements of identity...

02.19:00
... compatible. How to make them work together. And that is what the world of Islam has to work on: not to reject its religious identity, but to make that religious identity compatible with the modern democratic, and liberal identity.

WOULD YOU SAY THAT THE SITUATION OF TURKEY ENTERING EUROPE, AND ALL THE QUESTIONS THAT COME WITH THAT, ARE THEY SHOWING US OF THE BORDERS OF WHAT DEMOCRACY ALLOWS? THE ELASTICITY OF DEMOCRACY, SOMEHOW?

02.19:40
Yes, that's a very good way of putting it. What the debate about Turkey is showing you, is the borders of democracy, and the limits of democracy. Because you don't want to take in a country which would vote into power another Hitler. An Islamic Hitler. And the question therefore is...

02.20:00
... is that happening in Turkey? And I would argue it is not, but it is a worthwhile debate. Because elections are only one part of what Europe has created, which is a whole system of democratic governance, and liberal governance. And the question is: where does Turkey fall on that spectrum, and how should one judge whether or not the institutions of Turkey are strong enough to take...

02.20:30
... all kinds of public participation, and all kinds of public voice. You have to have public voice, you have to have the institutions, and what does that balance? We are living with that in Turkey today.

SO IN THE END, THE CASE IN TURKEY IS ONE OF THE BEST SHOWCASES OF DEMOCRACY?

Yes, Turkey is one of the greatest experiments that we will ever see: in the nature of democracy, the limits of democracy, the shape of democracy.

02.21:00
I think it will be an experiment that is basically successful, and along the way we'll learn along.

SUPPOSE YOU'RE WRONG.

If I am wrong, I think that in a strange sense Turkey itself retains many safeguards to allow itself to correct. The Turkish army is not going to disappear, and the Turkish elites who are worried about this, are not going to disappear. And they have intervened in the past, and they will probably intervene in the future.

02.21:30
And remember, Europe is not being asked to make a decision until this issue is well resolved in Turkey. This issue is going to be resolved in Turkey in 2007, one way or the other. Turkey is not going to become a member of the European Union until 2020 at the earliest.

WHAT DO YOU EXPECT: DO YOU EXPECT TURKEY TO JOIN IN THE END?

In the end I have faith in Europe. I think that Europe will realize... In the end I have faith because I think Europe will realize...

02.22:00
... that Turkey is becoming an increasingly modern country. I think younger Europeans will see that, more than perhaps older Europeans, and I believe that Turkey will have changed a lot. And fifteen years from now, the Turkey we are talking about will look very different from the Turkey of today. Even in Central Anatolia. And that means that Europe will be dealing with, not a different country, but a country in a different stage of historical development. And that makes all the difference.